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Dispersants and Risk Communication
Background
Risk communications is a research area of the social sciences which is closely associated
with human dimensions and external communications. External communications,
traditionally in the purview of public affairs, may have multiple purposes including
influencing public beliefs, opinions, and judgments about the incident. Risk
communications on the other hand:
• Includes actions, words, and other interactions that incorporate and respect the
perceptions of the information recipients, intended to help people make more
informed decisions about threats to their health and safety (Ropeik, 2008).
• Ropeik, D. 2008. Risk Communication: More Than Facts and Feelings.
International Atomic Energy Commission Bulletin. 50-1:58-60.
• Is the interactive process of exchange of information and opinions among
individuals, groups, and institutions concerning a risk or potential risk to human
health or the environment. (National Research Council, 1989)National Research
Council, Committee on Risk Perception and Communication. Improving Risk
Communication. National Academy Press, Washington, DC. 1989.
• Means communication intended to supply lay people with the information they
need to make informed, independent judgments about risks to health, safety and
the environment. (Morgan et al 2001) Morgan, M.G., B. Fishoff, A. Bostrom and
C.J. Atman. 2001. Risk Communication: A Mental Models Approach.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
There are many approaches toward risk communications. Some of them focus on
improving the way external communications about risks are conducted, e.g., developing
better messages, and some focus on the content of risk communications, that is, sharing
technical information to support the assessment of the potential for risks. Better
messages, engagement, and risk-based communications were needed during DWH.
Dispersants as an oil spill response tool have been studied for effectiveness and effects
for over 40 years. Numerous studies conducted by academia, industry, and government
agencies have provided important scientific information on dispersants and their effects
on oil and the environment (Rowe et al., 2009; Khelifa et al., 2008; Lee, 2004). The
general findings have been that dispersants have become less toxic and more effective
since their original formulations. It is a generally accepted guideline that if the dispersant
is compatible with the specific oil and there is sufficient water depth (10 meters or
greater) and environmental conditions (water temperature and wave height) are right,
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dispersants may have a positive effect on reducing shoreline oiling and increasing the
biodegradation rate of the oil. The specific environmental trade-off analysis for any given
situation needs to be weighed and appropriate actions taken. To provide some
background, the extended quote below from a 1993 EPA document (Use of Chemical
Dispersants for Marine Oil Spills), reveals the fact that practical considerations for
dispersant use have historically been complex and contentious:
During an oil spill, a confluence of competing interests must be balanced.
The news media likely will be on the scene requesting statements on any
action that is being taken to respond to a spill event. Various interested
parties such as representatives of the vessel owner, the cargo owner, local
fishing interests, businesses dependant on tourism, local/state/federal
government agencies, environmental organizations, equipment vendors,
and cleanup companies will appear on the scene and advocate their
position to both the OSC and the press. Often the various groups approach
spill response from a different base with different objectives. Decision
making, management, and organization of a spill response are made more
difficult by maintaining open communication with the various interest
groups; but eventually the effort to maintain the interaction and develop it
organizationally can result in a much more effective response.
Management and organization of oil spill responses have been studied
(Cohn et al, 1991; Noble, 1991), but there are no tested paradigms that
account for the rapid action and public input required in a crisis situation.
With the multitude of problems that can arise in the U.S. legal
environment and the strong antipathy toward the use of dispersants that
has developed among some interested parties, the OSC should reflect
carefully on dispersant use and be ready for criticism. Two considerations
guide the decision-making process affecting an actual dispersant use
situation:
There is a reasonable probability of measureable success (e.g.,
preventing oil from reaching a beach or breeding area).
Consensus agreement has been reached between potentially
affected parties that dispersant application is worthy of being
evaluated as a response.
Measureable success, even if it is not complete, will vindicate the decision
to use a dispersant. Although it may not be required, a consensus
agreement will help to defuse critics who challenge a response that does
not achieve success. Numerous other considerations will come into play in
a response involving the prospect or the actual use of dispersants. It is
beyond the scope of this document to attempt to identify all of the
possibilities. The final decision will be based on the experience,
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understanding, and knowledge of the decision makers and their risk
tolerance.
At the Deep Water Horizon (DWH) response there was some degree of measurable
success, however, the consensus agreement in place prior to the spill was superseded by
the magnitude of the spill and subsequent large amount of dispersants applied. The
breakdown of consensus among government agencies contributed to public concern
regarding the use of dispersants. For example, the state of Louisiana abstained in its vote
for use of dispersants and the EPA began requiring additional topological testing and
limitations on dispersants.
Consensus Environmental Risk Analysis
Since the late 1990s, through the Consensus Environmental Risk Analysis (CERA)
process (Aurand, 1999), NOAA, the US Coast Guard and various stakeholders have
worked with several USCG Sectors and Area Committees to evaluate various oil spill
response options, identify specific biological resources at risk, seasonality, and through
scenario-based gaming weigh the relative pros and cons of different response actions.
The CERA approach was derived from EPA’s Ecological Risk Assessment framework
and guidelines (US EPA). These CERAs have involved local, state, and federal agencies
that would participate in the decision-making process, as well as natural resource
scientists and other stakeholders, e.g., NGOs and fisher representatives when available.
This model has proved to be a valid and methodical way to assess and discuss trade-offs
before an actual spill event.
A meeting convened by the CRRC entitled “Deepwater Horizon Dispersant Use
Meeting,” was attended by over 50 scientists, engineers and spill response practitioners
from numerous organizations, including: U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Mineral
Management Service (MMS), National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration
(NOAA), industry, state government, and academia. The ultimate goals of this meeting
were to: (1) Provide input to the affected Regional Response Teams (RRTs) on the use of
dispersants going forward in the DWH incident; and (2) Identify possible new monitoring
protocols in the event of continuing aerial and subsurface dispersant application (Coastal
Response Research Center. 2010.)
Two of the conclusions from this report that are germane to this topic are:
It was the consensus of this group that up to the time of the meeting, use of
dispersants and the effects of dispersing oil into the water column had generally
been less environmentally harmful than allowing the oil to migrate on the surface
into the sensitive wetlands and near shore coastal habitats.
For the DWH spill, the RRTs should provide for a continual re-evaluation of
tradeoff options going forward. Because of the magnitude of the DWH spill and
with the expectation of prolonged dispersant application, the RRTs should
consider commissioning a Consensus Ecological Risk Assessment, or equivalent,
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including use of existing temporal and spatial data on the resources at risk and
using the most current environmental data.
These recommendations were not performed. Had they been enacted some additional
degree of confidence regarding the use of dispersants may have been achieved for the
general public.
The response to the DWH spill had limited success with regard to communications
between various agencies, BP and the Coast Guard that reflected the CERA process. The
need to develop specific risk communications for dispersants was raised by the Coast
Guard in Houma, LA in late May, but by then the negative public perception regarding
dispersants was well underway. Effective risk communication is a complex process
where information and opinions are shared by risk management institutions with an
involved public. Risk communication attempts to build consensus concerning accurate
information through open and informed discourse (Fischoff et al. 1981).
Beginning in early June, Unified Command initiated community meetings in Louisiana
provided an important opportunity for stakeholder engagement and dialogue. These
meetings informed the development of risk communications and respond to stakeholder
questions and concerns. Also, BP began developing risk communication messages from
the JIC with input from dispersant and other technical specialists. However, risk
communications as a specific function was new to the incident command system process
and perceived primarily as targeted messaging. In this regard, there was no consensus
agreement for public involvement and how to apply risk communication principles in
communicating issues of risk and safety to the public.
What has not been as well studied is the way to convey this decision-making to the
general public. There have been several studies conducted on spill risk communications
(Tuler, et al. 2008; Tuler and Webler. 2008; Scholz, et al.1999). However, this line of
research provides little information on how the decisions were made (ICS process),
potential human impacts (low), fate of the oil (biodegradation), trade-offs (shoreline and
surface vs. water column impacts), what dispersant are made of (formulations and other
everyday products they are found in), etc. Most likely, this was due to the much smaller
amounts used in the past and the very short time duration during which they were
applied. Prior to DWH, agencies who made pre-authorization and incident-specific
decisions about the use of dispersants apparently envisioned spills that resulted from
vessels or pipelines, i.e., involving a release of oil over a short duration, e.g., on the order
of hours to a few days. Blowouts had occurred in the past and therefore were within the
US dispersant experience; nevertheless, no pre-authorization agreements contain explicit
restriction of dispersants to a limited duration. Indeed, contingency plans have focused
on “ecological issues” and human dimensions, e.g., economic, sociological and cultural
risks, have received very limited attention (Webler and Lord. 2010). Given that a rather
substantial body of research on the Exxon Valdez oil spill reveals severe and chronic
impacts to human populations, more direct concern needs to focus on human dimensions
(Picou et al. 2009; Picou. 2009). In particular, strategic risk communications regarding
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the use of dispersants and their consequences for the ecology and human health should be
addressed.
DWH Outreach Efforts
There were multiple efforts to inform the public about the necessity to use dispersants
during the response to the DWH spill. The Public Affairs and Liaison Units in
conjunction with the Environmental Unit (EU) prepared numerous press releases, public
information brochures, posters, talking points, graphics, and statements. The objective of
these activities were to inform the media and general public on the reasons dispersants
were being used, the rationale behind the decisions, the efforts to monitor the
applications, and the successes that were achieved.
From the vantage point of the command post, it appeared that the messages were being
received in the fashion that they were intended. Early in the incident several people came
from Alaska to talk with the fishing communities about their experiences during the
Exxon Valdez spill, in the interest of helping Gulf communities prepare for what to
expect. An important assumption was made prematurely that the two spills, and therefore
the effects, were very similar and that the Gulf experience would closely parallel the
Alaska experience. Some significant differences in the two spills were not acknowledged
(e.g., locale, environment, oil, etc.). As a result of these interactions, some people in the
community, including fishermen, developed negative sentiments toward dispersant
applications or the addition of “chemicals.” The Alaskan visitors to the Gulf spoke of
people getting ill and fish dying. The Unified Command staff in the command post was
not pro-active enough to get ahead of the negative stories being promulgated. The media
took the sensationalism of the 20-year-old Exxon Valdez saga and retold them to larger
audiences. Many examples of the ecological and social consequences of the Exxon
Valdez spill were supported by peer reviewed journal articles and research funded by
recognized agencies such as the National Science Foundation (Rice. 2009; Picou. 2009).
However, combined with claims of health impacts, the resulting media accounts led to a
confusing assortment of information that resulted in a “media scare” and increased
anxiety for residents along the Gulf of Mexico.
In the command post, the perception was that the in-situ burning was going to be a larger
concern to the public than dispersants. There was a history of dispersant use in the Gulf
of Mexico. Burning was a new response technique for the public. Burning is very visible,
with potential high human health impacts. Dispersants are fast acting and not easily seen
once they moved into the water column. However, it turned out that the burning was
viewed more as a “natural” way to remove the oil and the dispersants were seen as adding
more chemical into the ocean. The “invisible” threat posed by chemical dispersants to
both ecological and human communities increased public fears of new risks in a time of
crisis.
There was a suggestion from the EU to bring in sociologist as consultants to focus on the
human dimensions of this event. However, that effort was never funded. Human
dimensions are not included in the “normal” range of spill management activities. The
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human dimension aspects of spills are quite nebulous to natural scientists, spill managers,
and legal advisors. A study to overcome this would require reaching consensus within the
Unified Command and then identifying resources and assignments. This kind of activity,
like risk communications, does not align readily with a “next operational period” IAP
focus. There was a hope that the incident command could get ahead of the curve and
identify which issues would be of highest concern to the local populations and develop
methods to deal with them to minimize public fear. Nonetheless, this proposed strategy
never materialized and clearly reveals an important lesson for future oil spills. The human
dimension should be addressed with high priority and the accurate communication of
agency objectives to minimize perceived risks to the public needs to be clearly articulated
and implemented.
Since it was difficult to get the media to fully cover the dispersant issue in a fair and
representative manner, the Unified Command in Louisiana began a series of local
community meetings, which were held in each coastal parish throughout the summer of
2010. These were intended to facilitate improved communications by enabling one-onone discussions with response specialists and interested members of the community.
Members from the response who could directly address specific stakeholder questions
staffed approximately 30 tables. The tables addressed a wide variety of topics including
vessels of opportunity, safety, wildlife and dispersants. They were staffed by agencies
including NOAA, EPA, and Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality. In this
manner members of the public were able to meet the people responding and the
responders met the people at the parish level. It was successful on a small scale, as each
meeting could generally accommodate less than several hundred people.

Open house in Houma, LA. (Photo credit: Ed Levine, NOAA)
One item that became clear from talking to people at these sessions was that they had
many misconceptions about dispersants (they did not degrade, they were more toxic than
the oil, no one was monitoring the applications, they were being sprayed on people and
close to shore, etc.). One statement that provided insight to their concern was “We’d
rather deal with the devil we know, than the devil we don’t.” People in the Gulf are
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familiar with oil, not dispersants. From conversations with those who visited the
dispersant table, it was evident that many people also believed that any oil that was not
black must be due to dispersants. Because this oil readily changed from black to brown to
reddish-orange as it naturally weathered, people incorrectly assumed that all non-black
oil was due to chemical dispersants. Since local fishermen were involved in the response
as vessels of opportunity, their photos of the oil, comments, and incorrect assumptions
spread quickly via social media throughout the Gulf. The fisherman’s assumptions
combined with social media from trusted community members and further reduced the
effectiveness of risk communication efforts. Unresolved concerns about dispersants and
their impact on seafood safety and human health persist over a year after the DWH leak
was capped.
Risk Communications
The public understanding of risk is closely related to the role of science in characterizing
and evaluating risk. A wide variety of risks are viewed as important, while others can be
completely ignored. Risk communication is an important response during emergencies.
Risk management institutions should include public concerns in the early stages of the
response (Pidgeon, et al. 2010:136). The process by which risk, for example, the
protection of human health during application of dispersants, is socially defined by
science, reflects a complex process referred to as the “social amplification of risk”
(Kaperson, et al. 2003). Flows of information are widely available to the public, which
provide interpretations of this information involving messages from myriad sources.
Among the most important of these sources are scientists, mass media, environmental
groups, government agencies, opinion leaders and local authorities. These interpretations
ultimately result in the public’s assessment of the risk of their behaviors in terms of
accepting, ignoring, tolerating or modifying the risk (Kaperson and Kaperson. 2005:
106). Scientific information flows are especially important for the management and
communication of “risky” behavior. Nonetheless, public trust in the source of the
information flows, sponsorship of scientific inquiry and the clarity of the methodology
used by scientists are all important social interpretations that can lead to the acceptance or
rejection of scientific opinions.
The negotiation and elaboration of what constitutes the public understanding of risk often
occurs in the context of the mass media. It is apparent that the mass media is a prominent
source of information regarding technology, science, and risk perceptions. A variety of
media sources interpret scientific information, while also framing this information within
an organizational context that may include moral and political implications. Therefore,
the mass media has both direct and indirect effects on risk perceptions. Given the fact that
scientists often provide caveats of uncertainty regarding their information, journalistic
accounts often transform this uncertainty to what appears to be “absolute certainty”
(Morgan, et al. 2001). Simply put: “The problem in many cases is that when it comes to
news coverage the potentiality, uncertainty and ambiguity of risk have to be toned down.
Either a risk is truly and surely dangerous or it is not news at all” (Arnoldi. 2009: 131).
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The mass media may distort risk by either amplifying certain risks and/or ignoring others.
Given that the mass media often poorly communicates the scientific complexity of risks,
different media outlets may provide the public with interpretations that reflect their
political interests. For example, publications and blogs from environmental organizations
raised issues regarding the unknown chemical composition of dispersants, thereby
increasing uncertainty regarding exposure risk and seafood consumption. On the other
hand, government agencies will report the testing of seafood as comprehensive with their
results reflecting a high degree of certainty. When covered by the media, this discourse of
contradictory claims also becomes influential for public risk perceptions of the
appropriateness and safety of dispersants. The complex scientific questions concerning
differences between biota exposure to dispersants and the exposure of seafood to
dispersed oil are never addressed adequately by the mass media. This fact often results in
confusion and misunderstanding by the public of risks involved with dispersant use.
The perception of the safety of dispersant use involves a complex array of social factors.
The public perception of risk involves: 1) how well the risk is understood; 2) how the risk
is distributed across various groups; 3) the amount of personal control that can be exerted
over risk; and 4) whether the risk is voluntary or involuntary (Morgan, et al. 2001). This
information is delivered through a social framework with information flows from a
variety of sources including technology, science, and the mass media. Trust, or lack of
trust, in the sources of the information presented to the public is also critical for the
acceptance or rejection of risk communications. For example, several random surveys of
Gulf Coast residents clearly reveal a lack of trust in sources of risk information, including
government, corporations and various agencies (Table 1). Research conducted while the
DWH was releasing oil (Ulrich. 2011) and five months after the spill (Gill, Picou and
Ritchie. 2011) suggest that except for information provided by the Coast Guard,
Scientists, and NOAA, very little communication about the spill was viewed as
trustworthy by residents of Louisiana, Alabama and Florida. Essentially, there was strong
distrust in information provided by BP, the Federal Government, and websites /blogs.
The fact that 2 out of 3 respondents did not trust any information released by government
agencies, the media and environmental organizations reveals the social context of distrust
that characterized risk communications associated with the DWH spill.

Table 1: Trust in Information About the DWH Provided by BP, Government Agencies
and Other Sources
Percent of Respondents who Trust:
Coast Guard
NOAA
FDA
Local Government
EPA
AL State Government
Federal Courts

	
  

79%*
46%
36%
34%
32%
27%
23%

Scientists – 52%**
Environmental Orgs. – 37%
Newspapers – 34%
Network T.V. – 26%
BP – 18%
Websites/Blogs – 12%
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MMS
22%
Federal Government
17%
BP
13%
*Source of data: Gill, Picou and Ritchie. 2011

**Source of data: Ulrich. 2011

This lack of trust in risk communications regarding efforts to inform the public as to why
dispersant application was necessary for the DWH spill and the risk to human health and
seafood posed by such use is related to public fears and concerns about dispersants. This
fact reveals the importance of trust as it relates to perceptions of risk held by the public.
For example, risk managers need to distinguish between “critical trust” and absolute
“distrust” of the agency, scientific organization or corporation that is communicating
information about the risk of controversy (Pidgeon, et al. 2010). Absolute distrust by
people raises important concerns regarding the relationship between the public and the
risk management institution. The fact that communications in the early stages of the
DWH spill were inaccurate, i.e., amount of oil leaking kept changing and misinformation
that BP refused to accept government directives regarding dispersant use, created a social
context for public distrust of both the message and source of the message. Given this
context, it would have been strategic for all agencies to conduct public meetings to assess
public concerns regarding dispersants before providing risk statements on dispersant
application and risk (Bier. 2001). Providing more information is often viewed by the
public as “business as usual,” resulting in more distrust.
An important issue for effective risk communication is the rebuilding of trust in the
public after the threat to residents, tourists or seafood consumers has subsided. Indeed,
the use of dispersants following the DWH spill caused health fears among residents and
cleanup workers, while also raising concerns throughout the country regarding the safety
of Gulf of Mexico seafood. The fact that the public viewed the impact of dispersants as
“unknown” increased the perception of risk. When BP and NOAA officials visited
primary schools in Louisiana and told children that the dispersants applied to the oil were
as safe as laundry detergents, parents angrily responded in disbelief. Once again, by
providing “more information” risk managers actually produced more distrust among the
public concerning the risk of applying dispersants.
Trust
There are important antecedents to trust. First, trust in an institution requires a perception
by the public of organizational competence. Second, a belief in the benevolence of the
organization, which reflects a sincere concern of the public’s perspective of the risk.
Third, there needs to be a relationship of shared values between the public and the
institution (Siegrist, et al. 2010). That is, if a corporation’s values were profit at all cost,
then residents who are worried about health issues would not be trusting. This reveals a
disconnect between “shared values” (Savadori, et al. 2010). These elements combine to
form the important precedent to trust often referred to as “confidence.” Risk
communication strategies must include confidence building messages as well as
information.
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Risk communication often focuses on the dissemination of “facts” to the stakeholders.
However, increased knowledge, or the presentation of “facts” by experts is not correlated
with increased trust or acceptance of a risk. Actually, when knowledge is limited or such
claims contradictory, trust becomes very important for risk communication (Siegrist and
Cuetkovich. 2000). When the public is highly knowledgeable about a hazard, they are
less reliant on trust for the acceptance of risk. As noted by Siegrist and associates,
“confidence is based on familiarity, experience and past performance. Social trust, in
contrast, refers to the willingness to rely on others” (Siegrist et al. 2010: 268). When risk
communication occurs in a context of no public confidence in the source of the
information, there is a reaction of absolute distrust. Risk management institutions need to
be knowledgeable about the fears, needs and values of their target audience before
communication strategies are deployed (Siegrist et al. 2010: 282). Furthermore, risk
communication programs should acknowledge “uncertainty” with a plan to reduce issues
of concern. The involvement of representatives of environmental, local citizen and
trusted intermediary organizations in the characterization of risk communication facts
will also increase public confidence in the message. Indeed, it has been shown that risk
communications that strongly argue that health symptoms are not physical, but social
psychological in nature, result in a “blaming the victim” public perception. This, in turn,
may lead to the rejection of the risk communication message (Wessely. 2000).
Risk communication is a complex process that must involve confidence and trust by the
public in the risk management institution. Trust and confidence must be earned through
the expression of “shared values” which require equal-status participatory
communication strategies. Involvement of environmental groups, local citizen groups and
trusted intermediary organizations in open discourse with the public is the first step for
organizing effective risk communication concerning dispersant effects on health and
seafood safety. Risk management institutions involved in oil spill response should be
aware of their public image and attempt to project a positive concern for the public
through their organizational culture and their transparent discourse with other
stakeholders.
The Consensus Environmental Risk Analysis (CERA) process seeks to bring oil spill
decision-makers and their advisors together in US Coast Guard Sectors to review
potential response options for use during scenario-based oil spill incidents. Given that for
the DWH spill this process was focused on species and habitats present during the
scenario period, the consequences for public opinion or the effects on economic
conditions was minimized. The future application of this process should identify the
reasoning for using or not using different options and find effective strategies to
disseminate information to the general public and other stakeholders outside the Unified
Command system.
Lingering Issues
•

	
  

Questions related to this topic that were resolved during DWH:
o Is it possible to mount a coordinated large-scale dispersant operation?
o Can you monitor dispersant effectiveness?
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o Was the public affairs unit prepared for communicating risks from
dispersants to the public and other stakeholders?
•

Knowledge gaps and questions that remained unresolved by DWH:
o How much is too much?
o What are the effects on sea life?
o How long do dispersants remain in the environment?

•

New questions that resulted from DWH relative to the topic:
o How do you explain the issues involved in tradeoffs?
o How do you build a trusting relationship after a disaster occurs?
o What are some products that contain similar chemicals to dispersants that
people can relate to?
o How do you maintain, or rebuild, public confidence in seafood safety?

•

R&D needed to resolve outstanding questions relative to topic:
o How can you monitor for effect in a more real-time mode and translate the
results to risk communications for public health and safety?
o How can you build shared values during a spill response?
o How do you plan for and recognized the human dimensions of oils spills?

Conclusions
The lessons learned from the DWH spill provide information across a broad array of
concerns associated with large-scale oil spills. An effective, coordinated large-scale
dispersant operation was mobilized following the DHW blowout. A monitoring system
that detailed the effectiveness of both surface and subsurface applications was designed
and applied throughout the spill area. Present research efforts are collecting scientific
data on the impacts of dispersants on marine habitats and sea life. Questions regarding
impacts and the degradation process of dispersants in the marine environment will also be
addressed by these on-going scientific studies. At this time, the risks posed to the
environment and human health by the dispersant applications in the Gulf of Mexico
appears to be minimal. Nonetheless, public opinion continues to challenge such
contentions.
The lessons from the DHW spill also identify new questions and research needs directly
associated with risk communication issue that emerged over the spill timeline and
continue to the present. First, risk management institutions should anticipate “media
scares,” the reporting of contradictory information and a general lack of accurate
information for the scientific basis of procedural decisions made by the unified command
system. The confusing context of the mass media, including social media sites, identifies
a challenge for risk management institutions that involves broadening the participatory
discourse of risk communications, building trust in information provided to the public
and acknowledging the uncertainty of risks when appropriate. Risk management
institutions need to be familiar with the economic, social and cultural characteristics of
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communities impacted by oil spills. The importance of the human dimension for
responding to oil spills became apparent in the months following the DHW incident.
The fact that some limited success in communications regarding dispersants and their use
was achieved at small community meetings attests to the importance of understanding
public concerns and fears prior to providing risk communication “facts” from the United
Command. The participation of trusted intermediary organizations, such as Sea Grant,
environmental organizations, public officials, etc., in these gatherings would also provide
a mechanism to establish “shared values” between spill response organizations and
residents of impacted communities. This process would result in positive trust building
activities which enhance public acceptance of risk communication information.
There are also continuing problems regarding public perceptions of seafood safety, water
quality, air quality and other ecological risks associated with the aftermath of the DWH
release of over 200 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. The human dimension
of oil spills projects a number of economic, social, cultural and legal issues well into the
future. Although the DWH spill is physically over, consequences for the human
dimension will persist. Future basic research on risk perceptions regarding seafood safety
and human health are needed and applied programs on the effective delivery of important
risk information should be implemented at the community level. People continuously
reflect on risk behaviors and risk perceptions do change over time. Because of this fact,
efforts to build trust in risk management institutions through participatory discourse
within local communities should be a high priority for fostering recovery. Given that
social surveys show that the Coast Guard, reports from scientists and NOAA were the
most trusted entities for the Gulf Coast residents identifies three important sources for
sponsoring and implementing future risk communications about the lingering
consequences of the DWH spill.

	
  

12	
  

Literature Cited
Arnoldi, Jakob. 2009. Risk. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Aurand, D., L. Walko, R. Pond. 2000. Developing Consensus Ecological Risk
Assessments: Environmental Protection In Oil Spill Response Planning A Guidebook.
United States Coast Guard. Washington, D.C. 148p.
Bier, V, M. 2001. On the State of the Art: Risk Communication to the Public. Reliability
Engineering and System Safety. 71: 139-150.
Center for Disease Control. Dispersants and Your Health.
http://emergency.cdc.gov/gulfoilspill2010/2010gulfoilspill/dispersants_coastal_residents.
asp. 2010.

Don Aurand, The application of ecological risk assessment principles to dispersant
use planning, Spill Science & Technology Bulletin, Volume 2, Issue 4, 1995, Pp.
241-247.
Coastal Response Research Center (CRRC). 2010. Deepwater Horizon Dispersant Use
Meeting Report. University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH. 21 pp and appendices.
Cohn, R. E., W. A. Wallace, and J. R. Harrald. 1991. Organizing for Response: The
Unresolved Problem. In: Proceedings From the 1991 Oil Spill Conference., pp. 29-33..
Fischoff, B. S. Lichtenstein, P. Slovic, S. Derby and R. Keeney. 1981. Acceptable Risk.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gill, D.A., J.S. Picou and L. Ritchie. 2011. The Exxon Valdez and BP Oil Spills:
Comparisons of Initial Social and Psychological Impacts. American Behavioral Scientist.
In Press.
IT Corp. Use of Chemical Dispersants for Marine Oil Spills. EPA Contract No. 68-C20108. 1993. Pp. 68-71.
Kaperson, J.X., R.E. Kaperson, N. Pidgeon and P. Slovic. 2003. The Social Amplification
of Risk: Assessing 15 Years of Research. Pp. 13-46 in N. Pidgeon, R.E. Kaperson and P.
Slovic (eds.) The Social Amplification of Risk. Cambridge University Press.
Kaperson, J. X. and R.E. Kaperson. 2005. The Social Contours of Risk. London:
Earthscan.
Khelifa, A., Fingas, M., Brown, C. 2008. Effects of Dispersants on Oil-SPM Aggregation
and Fate in US Coastal Waters.
http://rfp.crrc.unh.edu/projects/viewProject.php?PROJECT_ID=16

	
  

13	
  

Lee, R.F., Maruya, K.A. 2004. Fate and Effects of Emulsions Produced After Oil Spills in
Estuaries. http://rfp.crrc.unh.edu/projects/viewProject.php?PROJECT_ID=1
Morgan, M.G., B. Fishoff, A. Bostrom and C.J. Atman. 2001. Risk Communication: A
Mental Models Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Noble, J. M. 1991. Crisis Management During and Oil Spill Response. In: Proceedings
From the 1991 Oil Spill Conference., pp. 35-37
Picou, J.S. 2009. When the Solution Becomes the Problem: The Impacts of Adversarial
Litigation on Survivors of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. University of St. Thomas Law
Journal. 7 (1): 68-88.
Picou, J.S., C. Formichella, B.K. Marshall, & C. Arata. 2009. Community Impacts of the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Synthesis and Elaboration of Social Science Research. Pp.
279-307 in S.R. Braund and J. Kruse (eds) Synthesis: Three Decades of Social Science
Research on Socioeconomic Effects Related to Offshore Petroleum Development in
Coastal Alaska. MMS OCS Study Number 2009-006. Minerals Management Service,
Alaska, OCS Region, Anchorage, AK.
Pidgeon, N., W. Poortinga and J. Walls. 2010. Skepticism, Reliance, and Risk Managing
Institutions: Toward a Conceptual Model of ‘Critical Trust’. Pp. 117-142. In M. Siegrist,
Timothy C. Earle and H. Gutscher, (eds) Trust in Risk Management. London. Earthscan.
Rice, S. D. 2009. Persistence, Toxicity and the Long-Term Environmental Impact of the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. University of St. Thomas Law Journal. 7 (1): 55-67.
Rowe, C.L., Mitchelmore, C.L., Baker, J.E. 2009. Lack of biological effects of water
accommodated fractions of chemically- and physically-dispersed oil on molecular,
physiological, and behavioral traits of juvenile snapping turtles following embryonic
exposure. Science of The Total Environment. 407(20): 5344-5355
Savadori, L., M. Graffeo, N. Bonini, L. Lombardi, K. Tehtori and R. Rumiati, 2010.
Rebuilding Consumer Trust in the Context of a Crisis. Pp. 159-172 in M. Siegrist, T.C.
Earle and H. Gutscher (eds.) Trust in Risk Management. London’s: Earthscan.
Scholz, D.K., A.H. Walker, J.H. Kucklick, R.G. Pond. 1999. Aligning Expectations and
Reality: A Summary of Dispersant Risk Communication Issues. In: Proceedings of the
1999 International Oil Spill Conference, Seattle, WA. American Petroleum Institute,
Washington, DC. 6 p.
Siegrist, M. and G. Cvetkovich. 2000. Perceptions of Hazards: The Role of Social Trust
and Knowledge. Risk Analysis. 20: 713-719.

	
  

14	
  

Siegrist, M., T.C. Earle and H. Gutscher. 2010. Trust in Risk Management: Uncertainty
and Skepticism in the Public Mind. London: Earthscan.
Siegrist, M., H. Gutscher and C. Keller. 2010. Trust and Confidence in Crisis
Communication: Three Case Studies. Pp. 267-283 in M. Siegrist, T.C. Earle and H.
Gutscher (eds). Trust in Risk Management. London: Earthscan.
Tuler, S. and Webler, T. 2008. Defining and selecting objectives and performance
metrics for oil spill response assessment: A process design integrating analysis and
deliberation. Technical report submitted to the Coastal Response Research Center,
NOAA Grant # NA04NOS4190063. Project Number: 05-983. Greenfield, MA: Social
and Environmental Research Institute, Inc.
Tuler, S., Webler, T., and Kay, R. 2008. Comparing stakeholders’ objectives for oil spill
response: A Q study of four regions. Technical report submitted to the Coastal Response
Research Center, NOAA Grant # NA04NOS4190063. Project Number: 05-983.
Greenfield, MA: Social and Environmental Research Institute, Inc.
Ulrich,J.D. 2011. The Social Impacts of the Gulf Oil Disaster. University of New
Hampshire: Carsey Institute. Brief No.25.Spring.
US EPA Ecological Risk Assessment.
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/nrd/era.htm
Webler, Thomas, and F. Lord. 2010. Planning for Human Dimensions of Oil Spills and
Spill Response. Environmental Management (45): 723-738.
Wessely, S. 2000. Responding to Mass Psychogenic Illness. New England Journal of
Medicine. 342 (2): 129-130.

The Federal Government Response: Dispersant Use In BP Oil Spill.
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_pdfs/external/content/documen
t/2931/835583/1/Fact%20Sheet%20Dispersants%20july%2029%202010-1.pdf
Supplemental Literature
Pond, R., J.H. Kucklick, A.H. Walker, A. Bostrom, P. Fischbeck, and D. Aurand. 1997.
Bridging the Gap for Effective Dispersant Decisions through Risk Communication. In:
Proceedings of the 1997 International Oil Spill Conference, April 7-10, Ft. Lauderdale,
FL. American Petroleum Institute. Washington, DC. pp. 753-759.
Bostrom, A., P. Fischbeck, J.H. Kucklick, R. Pond, and A.H. Walker. 1997. Ecological
Issues in Dispersant Use: Decision-makers’ Perceptions and Information Needs.
Prepared for: Marine Preservation Association.

	
  

15	
  

Bostrom, A., P. Fischbeck, J.H. Kucklick, and A.H. Walker. 1995. A Mental Models
Approach for Preparing Summary Reports on Ecological Issues Related to Dispersant
Use. Marine Spill Response Corporation, Washington, DC. MSRC Technical Report
Series 95-019, 28 p.
3 risk communications pamphlets prepared using the findings from the mental model
methodology:
Boyd, J.N., J.H. Kucklick, D. Scholz, A.H. Walker, R. Pond, and A. Bostrom. 2001.
Effects of Oil and Chemically Dispersed Oil in the Environment. Prepared by Scientific
and Environmental Associates, Inc., Cape Charles, VA. Prepared for the American
Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC. 49 p.
http://www.api.org/ehs/water/spills/index.cfm
Scholz, D.K, J.H. Kucklick, R. Pond, A.H. Walker, D. Aurand, A. Bostrom, and P.
Fischbeck. 1999. A Decision-maker’s Guide to Dispersants: A Review of the Theory and
Operational Requirements. Prepared by Scientific and Environmental Associates, Inc.,
Cape Charles, VA. Prepared for the American Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC. API
Publ. 4692. 37 p. http://www.api.org/ehs/water/spills/index.cfm
Scholz, D.K, J.H. Kucklick, R. Pond, A.H. Walker, A. Bostrom, and P. Fischbeck. 1999.
Fate of Spilled Oil in Marine Waters: Where Does It Go, What Does It Do, and How Do
Dispersants Affect It? Prepared by Scientific and Environmental Associates, Inc., Cape
Charles, VA. Prepared for the American Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC. API Publ.
4691. 43 p. http://www.api.org/ehs/water/spills/index.cfm
Walker, Ann Hayward, D.L. Ducey, S. J. Lacey, and J.R. Harrald. 1995. Implementing an
Effective Response Management System. International Oil Spill Conference. Technical
Report IOSC-001. American Petroleum Institute. Washington, DC. 20005. USA

	
  

16	
  

